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THE "ENDS OF JUSTICE" REVISED: HOW TO
INTERPRET RICO'S PROCEDURAL PROVISION,
18 U.S.C. § 1965
Benjamin Rolf*
INTRODUCTION
RICO's procedural provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965, causes great con-
fusion in the courts. This section generates significant disagreements
on two interpretation issues. First, the circuits are split on which sub-
sections of § 1965 authorize national service of process. Second,
§ 1965(b) allows national service of process and makes the court a
proper venue for additional defendants only if the "ends ofjustice" so
require. The courts have interpreted this "ends of justice" require-
ment in many different ways but have failed to take account of the
term's origin in the antitrust statutes and the meaning given to the
language in the antitrust context.
I. RICO BACKGROUND
A. Purpose and Legislative History of RICO
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO)1 in 1970 to "provide new weapons of unprece-
dented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic
roots."2 RICO is not limited to 'Just mobsters"; it applies in other con-
texts as well. 3 Many have argued Congress did not intend the harsh
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.S., Iowa State
University, 2002. I would like to thank Professor G. Robert Blakey and the members
of the Notre Dame Law Review for their assistance and support.
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 944 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (2000)).
2 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
3 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985); G. Robert Blakey&
Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology
Center v. Wolersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 529 n.11 (1986) (citing cases).
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punishment of white-collar crime that results under RICO,4 but like
many statutes, the original purpose for its passage does not limit the
application of its text.
5
Essentially, RICO punishes "'enterprise criminality', that is, pat-
terns of racketeering activity committed by, through, or against an en-
terprise."'6 An enterprise is defined to include "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."7 Racketeering activity is defined to include numerous crimes,8
and a pattern exists when at least two racketeering acts occur within a
ten-year span. 9 RICO does not criminalize any behavior that was not
already criminal. 10 Rather, it acts as a sentencing enhancement for
defendants committing a pattern of racketeering crimes through, by,
or against enterprises.
RICO violations may be prosecuted as criminal offenses punisha-
ble by up to twenty years in jail and forfeiture of assets. 11 Congress
also provided a civil cause of action in RICO. It allows private plain-
tiffs to sue defendants who violate RICO when the violation injures
4 Blakey & Cessar, supra note 3, at 576 n.217 (citing articles arguing that RICO
was over-inclusive and arguments that RICO was meant to apply to businesses engag-
ing in mobster-type activities).
5 Id. at 567 n.189 (citing Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Star. 13 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)), which was passed to aid Reconstruction and to
give the federal government control over non-complying state officials, as an example
of a statute that has been applied beyond its original limited purpose because of the
statute's broad, general language).
6 Id. at 529; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). The statute states that the following
activities are violations of RICO:
(a) using or investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity to acquire any interest in, or the establishment or operation of an
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
commerce;
(b) acquiring or maintaining any interest or control, through a pattern
of racketeering activity in an enterprise that is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate commerce;
(c) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
commerce; and
(d) conspiracy to violate (a) through (c).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (2000).
8 Id. § 1961(1).
9 Id. § 1961(5).
10 One element of a RICO claim is that racketeering activity was committed,
which is defined by the violation of one of a list of offenses. Id. §§ 1961, 1962. Thus,
to violate RICO, one must necessarily violate one of the other predicate offenses.
11 Id. § 1963.
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the plaintiffs' "business or property" and allows recovery of treble
damages and attorney's fees.12 RICO also expands jurisdiction and
venue requirements, making it easier for plaintiffs to file civil RICO
suits. 13 These procedural provisions, civil suit provisions, and reme-
dies were taken directly from the antitrust statutes and integrated into
RICO.
B. Interpreting RICO
The Supreme Court has taken many opportunities to interpret
RICO. The principles promulgated by these precedents prescribe
how RICO's broad language must be interpreted. Most important, of
course, is to look at the plain language of the statute' 4 and its struc-
ture. 15 The statute itself states that RICO is to "be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes. '16 The court looks to legislative
history to interpret ambiguous language in RICO. 17 The purpose of
the statute is to stop the infiltration of legitimate business by organ-
ized crime, but the application of RICO is not limited by its purpose.
18
The legislative history and textual comparisons show clearly that
RICO was based on antitrust statutes, and RICO ought to be inter-
12 Id. § 1964(c). The statute states that "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
13 Id. § 1965.
14 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987); Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580,
593 (1981).
15 Russello, 464 U.S. at 22-23; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581, 587.
16 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
941, 947. The statute provides: "(a) The provisions of this title shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 491 n.10, 497-98 (1985); Russello, 464 U.S. at 21; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587,
593. However, the Supreme Court has also said that liberal interpretation, while it
seeks to ensure that an overly narrow interpretation is avoided, is not an invitation to
apply RICO beyond the purposes that Congress intended. Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993).
17 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994) (citing Reves,
507 U.S. at 177; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486, 489; Turkette, 452
U.S. at 586, 589.
18 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989); Russello, 464 U.S.
at 28 (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591. The statute is not
limited to the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 495, 499; Russello, 464 U.S. at 28; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590-91.
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preted in light of this fact.19 When Congress includes limiting lan-
guage in a statute, the presumption is that Congress intends to give
effect to this language.
20
II. OBTAINING VENUE AND JURISDICTION OVER
CIVIL RICO DEFENDANTS
A. Overview of RICO's Provisions Expanding Venue
and Personal Jurisdiction
Section 1965 expands venue and junrsdiction in a rather compli-
cated fashion. An initial summary of § 1965 might be helpful. Sec-
tion 1965(d) authorizes national service of process, including
summons, and thus personal jurisdiction over any RICO defendant if
served in a judicial district in which the defendant "resides, is found,
has an agent, or transacts his affairs." Venue for these defendants
must be satisfied by the requirements of the general venue statute or
§ 1965(a). Once a RICO defendant is within a court's jurisdiction
and venue, § 1965(b) allows a court to serve process on, and be a
proper venue for, any other RICO defendant if the charges against
the additional defendants are connected to the case against the first
defendant and the case against the first defendant cannot be fully ad-
judicated without the presence of the additional defendants.
1. Personal Jurisdiction
A court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant by service
of process delivered in accordance with constitutional and statutory
requirements. 2 1 Personal jurisdiction is based on the premise that a
court only has power to punish a defendant who has some relation-
ship to the territory in which the court sits and the government that
gives the court its power.22 A defendant's citizenship, presence, or
sufficient contacts within the forum give the forum court personal ju-
risdiction. The doctrine is enshrined in Fourteenth Amendment due
process for state courts and in Fifth Amendment due process for fed-
eral courts. 23 The personal jurisdiction of a court is also limited by
19 RICO was modeled on the antitrust statutes, but it is not necessarily limited by
antitrust doctrine. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 n.15 (1992);
Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 241; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 487, 498-99.
20 See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23-24; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581.
21 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.02[1], at 4-44.17
(3d ed. 2002).
22 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.2, at 97 (3d ed. 1999).
23 Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 100 (1987); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
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statute. For federal courts, personal jurisdiction must satisfy the re-
quirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k).2 4
Rule 4(k) limits personal jurisdiction of federal courts to those
defendants "who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is lo-
cated. '2 5 Thus, a federal court's personal jurisdiction generally is no
greater than the courts of the state in which the federal court sits.
Rule 4(k) also gives a federal court personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants "when authorized by a statute of the United States." 26 Thus, Con-
gress can allow courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
defendants located anywhere in the nation,27 so long as Fifth Amend-
ment due process is not violated.28
RICO contains two provisions that expand personal jurisdiction.
First, § 1965(d) allows national service of process over defendants, so
long as service is given within the 'Judicial district in which such per-
son resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." 29 Second,
if a court has jurisdiction over one RICO defendant, then § 1965(b)
24 FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k). Rule 4(k) states:
(1) Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to es-
tablish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
(A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located, or
(B) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and is served at
a place within a judicial district of the United States and not more than
100 miles from the place from which the summons issues, or
(C) who is subject to the federal interpleaderjurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1335, or
(D) when authorized by a statute of the United States.
(2) If the exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is
also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish
personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
Id.
25 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (A).
26 FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
27 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000).
28 See Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Congress could
provide for service of process anywhere in the United States."); Robertson v. R.R.
Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) ("Congress has the power, likewise, to provide
that the process of every district court shall run into every part of the United States.");
Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]here is no
constitutional obstacle to nationwide service of process in the federal courts in fed-
eral-question cases.").
29 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d).
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allows national service of process over other related RICO defendants
to the extent allowed by Fifth Amendment due process if the "ends of
justice" also allow it.30 Because Rule 4(k) (1) (D) allows Congress to
override the default personal jurisdiction requirements for federal
courts, § 1965(b) or (d) and Fifth Amendment due process are the
only requirements that must be met for a court to have personal juris-
diction over a RICO defendant.
2. Venue
Venue is a statutory requirement designed to ensure that the fo-
rum in which the case is heard is convenient for the resolution of the
case.31 The "purpose of statutory venue provisions 'is to protect the
defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or incon-
venient place of trial.' "32 The general venue statute is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391. 3 3 Venue is proper under this statute if the case is brought
either in the district in which a substantial part of the acts giving rise
to the claim occurred or in a district in which a defendant lives if all of
the defendants live in the same state. 34 If either of these options is
unavailable, venue is proper in any judicial district in which a defen-
dant is found.
35
Congress may supplement or limit the basic venue statute by en-
acting special venue provisions.36 Usually, special venue provisions
add to the general venue statute, and venue can be obtained under
the general venue statute or the special venue statute unless there is
legislative intent to limit the number of forums having proper venue.
The Supreme Court made this clear in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez,37 when it
considered whether the special venue provision of the Jones Act lim-
30 Id. § 1965(b).
31 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 22, § 2.15, at 79.
32 Payne v. Mktg. Showcase, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 656, 658 (N.D. IIl. 1985) (quoting
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979)).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) governs venue in federal question cases. It states that
venue is proper for federal question cases only when the case is brought in
(1) ajudicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in
the same State, (2) ajudicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of prop-
erty that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in
which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000) (RICO); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (antitrust).
37 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
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ited which forums had proper venue under the standard venue stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Because the intent behind the addition of a
special venue provision to the Jones Act was to expand the number of
forums with proper venue, a forum could have proper venue under
either the venue provisions of the Jones Act or the standard venue
statute. 3
8
RICO has special venue provisions in § 1965(a) and (b). Section
1965(a) makes a court a proper venue when it sits in a district "in
which [a defendant] resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his
affairs."39 Congress intended this venue provision to expand the num-
ber of forums with proper venue.40 Thus, a court will have proper
venue either under RICO's venue provision or the standard venue
provision, § 1391.41 Once a court is a proper venue for one RICO
defendant, § 1965(b) makes the court a proper venue for all "other"
RICO defendants if the "ends of justice" require it. Thus, a court will
be a proper venue for a RICO defendant if the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1965(a), (b), or 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are satisfied.
B. Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction over the Initial RICO Defendant:
§ 1965(d)
Section 1965(d) states simply that "[aill other process in any ac-
tion or proceeding under this chapter may be served on any person in
any judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs."42 An analysis of all of § 1965 is neces-
sary to see that national service of a summons is included in "all other
process."
Section 1965(a) expands venue and does not authorize the ser-
vice of any process. Section 1965(b) grants national service of process
and makes a court a proper venue for RICO defendants if at least one
related RICO defendant has been brought under the court's jurisdic-
tion and venue under another section and the "ends of justice" allow
38 Id. at 207 (holding that because the intent of the venue provision in the Jones
Act was to expand venue, venue is not improper under § 1391).
39 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
40 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034
(stating that § 1965 "contains broad provisions regarding venue and process, which
are modeled on present antitrust legislation"); 116 CONG. REc. H35,196 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Celler) (stating that RICO's venue provision "is made
for nationwide venue and service of process"); A. Darby Dickerson, Curtailing Civil
RICO's Long Reach: Establishing New Boundaries for Venue and Personal Jurisdiction Under
18 U.S.C. § 1965, 75 NEB. L. REv. 476, 498 (1996).
41 See Dickerson, supra note 40, at 498 n.109 (citing cases).
42 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d).
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it. Section 1965 (b) says nothing about service of process over a defen-
dant when no RICO defendant is within the court's jurisdiction. Sec-
tion 1965(c) grants special subpoena power for witnesses. Section
1965(d) allows "all other process" to be served wherever the defen-
dant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. ' 43 Sec-
tion 1965(d)'s "other process" includes any process not allowed under
§ 1965(a), (b), or (c). Summons of a defendant when no other de-
fendant is within a court's jurisdiction is not covered in any other sec-
tion, so § 1965(d)'s "other process" includes service of process on
defendants generally.
Note also that § 1965(d) allows national service of process only if
the process is served where the defendant "resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs." This is the same as the venue limita-
tions in § 1965(a). Thus, under § 1965(d), national service of process
is effective only if it is served in a judicial district in which the plaintiff
could have had venue over the defendant under § 1965(a). Section
1965(a) and (d) operates in conjunction to give a court jurisdiction
(§ 1965(d)) and venue (§ 1965(a)). Section 1965(b) comes in only
when venue or jurisdiction is unavailable for a defendant under
§ 1965 (a) or (d) and the court already has jurisdiction over at least
one related RICO defendant. This interpretation gives meaning to
both § 1965(b) and (d).
Federal courts have split over whether both § 1965(b) and
§ 1965(d) authorize national service of process. The Fourth and the
Eleventh Circuits have held that § 1965(d) authorizes national service
of process. 44 Other circuits have not considered § 1965(d) to be a
grant of national service of process. The two leading cases from the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc.45 and
Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc.,4 6 viewed § 1965 (b)
as RICO's sole grant of national service of process. 47 The Second Cir-
cuit in PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. explicitly rejected
the view that § 1965(d) allows national service of process, arguing that
only § 1965(b) allows national service of process. 48 Federal district
courts in other circuits continue to puzzle over which § 1965 subsec-
43 Id.
44 ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
H. REP. No. 91-1549, at 4 (1970)); Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("Section 1965(d) of the RICO statute provides for service in any judicial
district in which the defendant is found.").
45 834 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987).
46 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986).
47 Id. at 539.
48 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998).
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tion authorizes national service of process. In Multi-Media Interna-
tional, LLC v. Promag Retail Services, LLC,49 a Kansas district court
overruled its previous position that § 1965(d) authorized national ser-
vice of process and adopted the PT United Can approach.
50
The Fourth Circuit in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc. held that
§ 1965(d) conferred personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a RICO
case so long as Fifth Amendment due process is not violated.51 The
case involved a South Carolina corporation suing New Hampshire de-
fendants in South Carolina federal court.5 2 The plaintiff asserted that
§ 1965(b) allowed for jurisdiction over the New Hampshire defend-
ants even though it had not established venue or personal jurisdiction
over any of the defendants. 53 The court held that § 1965(d), not
§ 1965(b), allowed for national service of process over all defendants,
because the defendants had "been served with process in a judicial
district where they respectively reside, are found, or transact their af-
fairs."' 54 The court then remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether venue was present under § 1965(a) or (b).
55
The district court in Bridge v. Invest America, Inc.5 6 offered an ex-
cellent discussion of the issue. The court in Bridge held that both
§ 1965(b) and (d) conferred national service of process, though
§ 1965(b) could only be used when one defendant was within the
court's proper venue. 57 Thus § 1965(d) allowed for national service
of process without an "ends of justice" determination.
49 343 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D. Kan. 2004).
50 Id. at 1029-31.
51 ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997).
52 Id. at 621.
53 Id. at 625-27.
54 Id. at 627.
55 Id. ("The district court may ultimately have to decide.whether venue is proper,
either under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (a) or (b), or under general venue statutes.... Because
service was accomplished on the defendants where they were found, personal jurisdic-
tion was established.").
56 748 F. Supp. 948 (D.R.I. 1990).
57 Id. at 951. The court stated that "[s]ection 1965(b) does contain a provision
for nationwide service of process, and thus authorizes personal jurisdiction as well as
venue," but that it only applies when there is venue for the RICO claim for at least
one defendant. Id. The court went on to hold that "section 1965(d) authorizes per-
sonal jurisdiction over [the defendant], without regard to an 'ends ofjustice' determi-
nation under section 1965(b)." Id. at 952. The court cited various district court cases
holding § 1965(d) to be the general national service of process statute, including
Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1279, 1285
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388,
1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp.
1040, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), McIntyre's Mini Computer Sales Group, Inc. v. Creative Synergy
20051 1233
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The Second Circuit rejected the analysis of ESAB Group in PT
United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., and found § 1965(b) to be
RICO's sole national service of process provision. 58 The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed with many of its district courts, which had been al-
lowing national service of process under § 1965(d). 59 The court's
argument hinged on its view of § 1965(b). To determine whether
§ 1965(d)'s "other process" includes summons and establishes per-
sonal jurisdiction, the court rightly thought that whatever process is
not listed in previous sections falls into the "other process" category of
§ 1965(d). 60 The court held that because § 1965(b) applied to sum-
mons in one situation, § 1965(d)'s "other process" did not include
summons at all, even where § 1965(b) did not allow national service
of process.61 Basically, the court read § 1965(d) to state that all other
types of process may be served nationally, and that this excluded sum-
mons because summons was the type of process authorized by
§ 1965(b).
The only other commentator to consider the issue, Professor A.
Darby Dickerson, 62 agreed with PT United Can and argued that
§ 1965(d) does not provide for national service of process because
such an interpretation of § 1965(d) would make § 1965(b)'s national
service of process meaningless. 63 Professor Dickerson argued that if
Cop., 644 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1986), Hirt v. UMLeasing Corp., 614 F. Supp.
1066, 1069 (D. Neb. 1985), Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Industries, Inc., 590 F. Supp.
1453, 1458 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), and Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 438 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
58 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998).
59 See Deem v. Lockheed Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1230, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Perez-
Rubio v. Wyckoff, 718 F. Supp. 217, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F.
Supp. at 1402.
60 PT United Can, 138 F.3d at 71 ("[W]e find these sections to be equally impor-
tant to a coherent understanding of the meaning and functioning of the statute, par-
ticularly for the purpose of interpreting the terms 'other parties' and 'other process'
in §§ 1965(b) and (d), respectively.").
61 Id. at 72 ("Thus, § 1965(d)'s reference to '[a]ll other process,' means process
other than a summons of a defendant.").
62 Dickerson, supra note 40, at 514-15.
63 Id. Another reason why she interprets § 1965(b) in this manner is that she
disagrees with the policy, of having broad venue and service of process provisions,
fearing unfairness toward defendants. Id. at 480-82. This Note does not attempt to
determine what the best or fairest policy is. Attempts by courts to limit RICO's broad
language based on policy views have been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) ("If plaintiffs'
ability to use RICO against businesses engaged in a pattern of criminal acts is a defect,
we said, it is one 'inherent in the statute as written,' and hence beyond our power to
correct." (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985))); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n.10, 499-500 (1985) ("It is not for thejudici-
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§ 1965(d) allowed national service of process, no plaintiff would "ever
rely on 1965(b), when that section requires them to establish venue
over at least one other RICO defendant under 1965(a) and to pass the
'ends of justice' test."64
Professor Dickerson is incorrect in saying § 1965(b) would be
meaningless under the ESAB Group interpretation. Section 1965(b) is
the catch-all provision and is far from meaningless under the ESAB
Group interpretation. Section 1965 (b) is broader than § 1965 (d) and
allows service of process where § 1965(d) does not. Recall that
§ 1965 (d) allows service of process on defendants only within a district
that could be a proper venue under § 1965(a), because both sections
contain the identical limiting language. 65 In the context of § 1965(a),
a district in which a defendant is "found" has been interpreted to
mean a district in which a defendant is present and engaging in con-
tinuous activities. 66 Section 1965(b)'s only limitation on where sum-
mons may be served is that it must be within a district of the United
States. A defendant could not be served process in any district under
§ 1965(d) as he could be under § 1965(b). Section 1965(b) also ex-
pands venue to include defendants served under § 1965(b). Defend-
ants served under § 1965(d) must still satisfy the venue requirements
of § 1965(a).
The interpretation of § 1965(d) offered by the Second Circuit in
PT United Can and by Professor Dickerson is reasonable but ultimately
incorrect. Their view fails to consider how the liberal construction
clause should affect the interpretation of § 1965. The Supreme Court
held that courts must give effect to the liberal construction clause,
especially for RICO's remedial provisions. 67 Section 1965's grant of
national service of process is remedial, as it gives the plaintiff a greater
number of forums in which to sue, making it easier for the plaintiff to
obtain a remedy. By limiting national service of process to § 1965(b),
the PT United Can interpretation would deny plaintiffs national service
of process against many defendants. This limits a plaintiffs ability to
obtain a remedy by restricting the number of courts in which the
plaintiff may bring a case. Thus, RICO's liberal interpretation clause
ary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it simply
because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult applications.").
64 Dickerson, supra note 40, at 514-15.
65 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
67 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10 (" [I]f Congress' liberal-construction mandate is
to be applied anywhere, [it is to be applied] where RICO's remedial purposes are
most evident.").
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requires the adoption of the ESAB Group interpretation, which ex-
pands the plaintiffs choice of forum.
C. Obtaining Venue over the Initial RICO Defendant: § 1965(a)
Eighteen U.S.C. § 1965(a) is RICO's general venue provision.
Congress intended § 1965 (a) to supplement the standard venue provi-
sion, 68 allowing venue to be established for a RICO defendant
through 28 U.S.C. § 1391 or RICO's venue provision.69 Congress im-
ported § 1965(a)'s language directly from the antitrust statutes. Both
RICO and antitrust venue provisions allow for a plaintiff to bring suit
and for the court to have proper venue in any district in which a de-
fendant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs. '70
The term "resides" in a supplemental venue provision is inter-
preted to be synonymous with the meaning of "resides" in the general
venue statute, § 1391.71 A corporation's residence is not defined in
the same way as an individual's residence. A corporation is said to
reside in any district in which the district court could exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the corporation. 72
A person is "found" within a judicial district when he is present
within the district and engages in continuous activities within the dis-
68 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034;
see supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
69 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000). Section 1391(b) states:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citi-
zenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in: (1) a
judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situationed, or (3) a judicial district in
which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought.
Id.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000); seeJoseph E. Edwards, An-
notation, Construction and Application of Provision of Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a)) that Civil Action or Proceeding Under Act Against Any Person May Be
Instituted in Federal District Court for District in Which Such Person Resides, Is Found, Has
Agent, or Transacts His Affairs, 20 A.L.R. FED. 803, 805 (1974).
71 Cf Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1966) (interpreting "resides"
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (2000), to incorporate the general venue
definition of corporation "presence" as wherever it is doing business).
72 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Section 1391(c) states that "a defendant that is a corpora-
tion ...shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." Id.
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trict.7 3 For a corporation to be "found" within a judicial district, "it
must be present [there] by its officers and agents carrying on the busi-
ness of the corporation." 74 Occasional presence within a district is
insufficient to find that the defendant is "found" in the district.
7 5
If a defendant "has an agent" within a judicial district, venue is
proper as to the defendant. In Payne v. Marketing Showcase, Inc., the
plaintiff alleged that defendants "had agents" within the judicial dis-
trict because they had a business relationship with a corporation
within the district.7 6 The court held that one does not have an agent
in a district within the "has an agent" standard simply because of a
business relationship with a party within a district.
77
Courts are divided on whether a co-conspirator may be consid-
ered an agent of a defendant. 78 The better argument seems to be that
a co-conspirator is not an agent, as antitrust law does not recognize a
co-conspirator as an agent under its "has an agent" standard,79 and
RICO's language is based on the antitrust provisions.80 However,
under various other venue provisions, a co-conspirator has been held
to be an agent, making venue proper for the person for whom the
"agent" is acting.81
"Transacts his affairs" is equivalent to and ought to be interpreted
similarly to "transacts business" in the antitrust statute's venue provi-
73 Payne v. Mktg. Showcase, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 656, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (quoting
CCP Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co., 354 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1973), which based its
interpretation on similar antitrust language).
74 Id.; Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (D.
Mass. 1982); King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
75 Sunray Enters., Inc. v. David C. Bouza & Assocs., 606 F. Supp. 116, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
76 Payne, 602 F. Supp. at 658-59.
77 Id.
78 Compare id. at 659 (holding that an alleged co-conspirator is not an agent), and
Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 140 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Venue must be prop-
erly laid as to each defendant. The mere fact that some alleged co-conspirators may
have engaged in conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy within this district, does
not properly establish venue as to all other co-conspirators."), with Am. Trade Part-
ners, L.P. v. A-I Int'l Imp. Enters., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding
that a co-conspirator is an agent under RICO).
79 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1953) (suggesting
that a co-conspirator is not an agent for the purposes of antitrust law, though the
court refused to "pass upon" the theory); Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing
Co., 598 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1979).
80 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
81 E.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1985); De Moss v. First Artists Prod. Co., 571 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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sion.82 The test for the antitrust term "transacts business" is the "prac-
tical, everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying
on business 'of any substantial character.'" 8 3 A corporation is trans-
acting its affairs within a forum when it engages in business of a sub-
stantial and continuing character.8 4
Generally, a person is not "transacting his affairs" when he is act-
ing on behalf of his employer.8 5 A person is transacting his affairs
only when the business is personal. This "fiduciary shield doctrine"
prevents a court from finding a person has transacted his affairs
within a district if he is acting as a fiduciary on behalf of another. The
doctrine is accepted in some jurisdictions but not all.8 6
Making venue proper within a district in which a defendant trans-
acts his affairs is the greatest extension of venue beyond § 1391. Some
courts have stated that they will narrowly construe § 1965(a), as
§ 1391 is also available.8 7 However, narrowly construing RICO sec-
tions that expand venue conflicts with RICO's liberal interpretation
clause.
D. Obtaining Venue and Personal Jurisdiction over "Other" RICO
Defendants: § 1965(b)
Once a court has obtained jurisdiction and venue over one RICO
defendant, there may be other defendants who cannot be brought
before the court, either due to lack of venue under § 1391 or
82 Payne, 602 F. Supp. at 659 (holding that the phrase "transacts his affairs" is
equivalent to the phrase "transacts business" in the antitrust statute (quoting Bulk Oil
V. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1983))).
83 United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948).
84 Payne, 602 F. Supp. at 659 ("[A] corporation 'transacts business' within a forum
when 'substantial business activity is done within the forum with continuity of charac-
ter.'" (quoting CCP Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co., 354 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1973)).
85 Id. ("'[T]ransacts his affairs' refers to their personal affairs, not the affairs they
may have transacted on behalf of their employer.").
86 Compare Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp.
325, 329-330 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (holding that transacting business on behalf of one's
employer or acting as the fiduciary of another does not count as doing business for
purposes of § 1965(a), as defendants can only be considered to be transacting busi-
ness if it is personal business), with Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315, 328 (D. Mass.
1988) ("[Tlhe term 'transacts his affairs' as used in § 1965(a) does not mean that
venue of an individual defendant is restricted to a district in which the individual
defendant conducts his affairs.").
87 See, e.g., Medoil Corp. v. Clark, 753 F. Supp. 592, 598-99 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (nar-
rowly construing § 1965 (a) because venue can also be established by § 1391); King v.
Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (relying on differences between the
Clayton Act venue provisions and § 1965(a) to construe the language in § 1965(a)
narrowly).
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§ 1965(a), or due to an inability to serve process on the defendants
under § 1965(d) or Rule 4(k). Section 1965(b) is a catch-all provision
allowing a court to overcome remaining venue or jurisdiction issues
that prevent additional defendants from being brought before the
court.
Section 1965(b) states:
In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court
of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice
require that other parties residing in any other district be brought
before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned,
and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of
the United States, by the marshal thereof.
88
Professor Blakey stated that "[s] ection 1965(b) is one of the most
potentially far-reaching procedural devices of the RICO statute. It au-
thorizes the court, if the interests of justice require, to serve and join
parties over whom the court would not ordinarily have personal juris-
diction and where venue would normally be improper."89 Because
service of process is the means by which a court obtains personal juris-
diction,9° and § 1965(b) authorizes service of process nationwide, the
statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants
who would not otherwise be within the personal jurisdiction of the
court. Section 1965(b) allows a court to issue summons in any judicial
district of the United States. 9 '
Section 1965(b) expands venue by stating that the court may re-
quire that "other parties residing in any other district be brought
before the court."92 It would not be possible for the "other parties" to
be brought before the court unless the statute made the court a
proper venue for these "other parties." Without an expansion of both
venue and personal jurisdiction, § 1965(b) would not allow "other
parties" to be brought before the court. Section 1965(b) thus ex-
pands both personal jurisdiction and venue.
The use of § 1965(b) is limited, however. If the plaintiff cannot
obtain personal jurisdiction and venue over any RICO defendants in
the chosen forum, the inquiry ends and § 1965(b) has no effect. As
Professors Blakey and Gettings noted, "It]he suit need only be
88 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (2000).
89 G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1039 (1980).
90 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877) ("Jurisdiction is acquired . . . as
against the person of the defendant by the service of process ...
91 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b).
92 Id.
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brought in a proper court for at least one defendant. '93 Read to-
gether with § 1965(a), which allows "a civil action [under RICO]
against any person" to be instituted in any district court that has
proper venue,94 "other parties" refers to other defendants. 95 By using
the word "other," the statute assumes that one defendant is properly
before the court before "other" defendants are brought in under
§ 1965 (b).
96
The second requirement compels the plaintiff to show that the
"ends of justice" require bringing the "other" defendants before the
court. Courts have had great difficulty interpreting this requirement.
What they have missed is that the "ends of justice" language comes
directly from antitrust statutes and has been interpreted by the Su-
preme Court.97 No court has yet interpreted the "ends ofjustice" test
in accord with the relevant antitrust precedents and RICO's liberal
construction clause. In fact, no court has yet tied the "ends ofjustice"
requirement to its origin in 15 U.S.C. § 5. The "ends of justice" lan-
guage is sometimes read to require an initial finding that no other
court can exercise jurisdiction over all of the defendants before juris-
diction may be exercised. Other times, the "ends ofjustice" is held to
require an inquiry involving factors identical to those used in due pro-
cess personal jurisdiction analysis or for 28 U.S.C. § 1404 removal.
Nearly all of the requirements courts have read into the "ends of jus-
tice" test for RICO have been rejected in the antitrust context.98 The
interpretation required by antitrust precedents and supported by the
liberal interpretation clause is that the "ends of justice" allow a plain-
tiff to bring in all "other" defendants if the additional defendants are
related to the RICO claim and trying all of the defendants together in
one forum is necessary for the full adjudication of the RICO claim.
93 Blakey & Gettings, supra note 89, at 1039.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
95 See PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir.
1998) ("[Section] 1965(b) provides for nationwide service and jurisdiction over
'other parties' not residing in the district, who may be additional defendants of any
kind, including co-defendants, third party defendants, or additional counter-claim
defendants.").
96 Id.
[Section] 1965(a) grants personal jurisdiction over an initial defendant in a
civil RICO case to the district court for the district in which that person
resides, has an agent or transacts his or her affairs. In other words, a civil
RICO action can only be brought in a district court where personal jurisdic-
tion based on minimum contacts is established as to at least one defendant.
Id.
97 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
98 See infra note 138-40 and accompanying text.
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1. Current Approaches to Interpreting the "Ends of Justice" Clause
The Ninth Circuit in Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Invest-
ment, Inc.99 held that the "ends of justice" prevented the plaintiffs
from using § 1965(b) unless there was no other forum into which all
the defendants could be brought. 0 0 Other courts have followed
Butcher's Union and held that § 1965(b) applies only when all of the
RICO defendants could not be brought before any other court.10 1
The court in Butcher's Union was correct in noting that "Congress in-
tended the 'ends of justice' provision to enable plaintiffs to bring all
members of a nationwide RICO conspiracy before a court in a single
trial,"' 0 2 but there is no justification for the view that Congress in-
tended to provide plaintiffs with only one court in which to bring
RICO charges against all RICO defendants.
Other courts have used this no-other-possible-forum test as only
one factor to take into consideration. The court in Miller Brewing Co.
v. Landau'0 3 stated that "[w]hile the standards for determining
whether an 'ends of justice' finding should be made have not been
well defined, at least one factor that should be considered is whether
an alternative forum exists where venue would be proper as to all de-
fendants."'10 4 Even though all of the defendants were subject to the
jurisdiction of a New York court, the Miller court held that this fact
"should not be the sole consideration, especially where transferring
the case would result in extraordinary delay or some other extreme
prejudice against the plaintiffs interests." 10 5 The court reached its
result by weighing the inconvenience to the defendants with the po-
tential harm transferring the case would have caused to plaintiffs.
10 6
Other courts have followed this approach, judging the alternative fo-
rum test to be one factor when weighing whether to exercise jurisdic-
tion under § 1965(b).
10 7
99 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986).
100 Id. at 539.
101 E.g., PT Can United, 138 F.3d at 71-72 ("[T]he first preference, as set forth in
§ 1965(a), is to bring the action where suits are normally expected to be brought.
Congress has expressed a preference in § 1965 to avoid, where possible, haling de-
fendants into far flung fora."); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 672
(7th Cir. 1987).
102 Butcher's Union, 788 F.2d at 539.
103 616 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
104 Id. at 1290.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1291.
107 See United Power Ass'n, Inc. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., No. 3-89 Civ. 766, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18874, at *9 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 1992) ("The lack of an alternative
forum is an important factor in determining whether the 'ends of justice' require
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The court in Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone s08 adopted a
similar factor-based approach, considering three factors that ulti-
mately weighed in favor of finding that the "ends of justice" gave the
court jurisdiction to hear the case. 109 First, it considered whether
other districts would have proper venue and personal jurisdiction over
all of the defendants. The court determined it was possible but did
not determine whether there was another such forum.110 Second, it
considered whether defendants would be inconvenienced by defend-
ing in the current forum. Third, the court considered whether judi-
cial economy warranted exercising jurisdiction." I Other courts have
considered other factors, 12 including the location of related cases,113
the location of the majority of witnesses and evidence, 114 the location
of the district with the most contacts with the RICO claim, 15 and the
state whose laws will govern supplemental claims.116
2. Interpreting the "Ends of Justice" Clause in Light of Its
Antitrust Origins and the Liberal Interpretation Clause
Section 1965(b) states that national service of process is allowed
in "any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court
of the United States in which it is shown that the 'ends of justice'
require that other parties . . . be brought before the court.""11 7 Two
factors must guide the interpretation of § 1965(b)'s "ends of justice"
requirement: the antitrust precedents interpreting the original "ends
of justice" clause, and RICO's liberal interpretation clause.
a. Antitrust Precedents
The "ends of justice" requirement comes directly from 15 U.S.C.
§ 5, which states:
exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction."); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus.,
Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 n.8 (D. Del. 1978).
108 768 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1991).
109 Id. at 491-92.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 See Dickerson, supra note 40, at 519-21 (listing numerous factors with citations,
including factors listed here).
113 See, e.g., Wood v. Barnette, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 936, 940 (E.D. Va. 1986).
114 See, e.g., Walters v. Beavers, No. 89-696-JIF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *18
(D. Del. Feb. 6, 1991); Wood, 648 F. Supp. at 940.
115 See, e.g., Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Del. 1984).
116 See, e.g., Walters, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432 at *18.
117 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (2000).
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Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding
under section four of this Act may be pending, that the ends of
justice require that other parties should be brought before the
court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they
reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoe-
nas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal
thereof.' 18
The purpose of the provision in RICO is the same as in the antitrust
context: to give the plaintiff a choice of forum and to bring all of the
defendants connected to the alleged illegal transaction within a single
forum.
It is not necessary to examine the legislative history to see that the
antitrust provisions were the basis for RICO's "ends ofjustice" require-
ment, but examining it adds additional proof. The Senate report
states that "[s]ection 1965 contains broad venue provisions and pro-
cess powers. They are modeled on present antitrust legislation."'1 19 It
goes on to say that "[t]he committee believes that these broad provi-
sions are required by the nationwide nature of the activity of organ-
ized crime." 120 The House report is nearly identical.
121
The Supreme Court has often looked to the antitrust statute
when interpreting ambiguities in the RICO statute12 2 and has only re-
fused to incorporate antitrust concepts when doing so would not
make sense in a RICO context.1 23 Here, the language and purpose of
the antitrust counterpart to § 1965(b) is identical, and the "ends of
118 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). Section 4 charges U.S. Attorneys to bring suits in their
districts to prevent and restrain antitrust violations, id. § 4, and thus § 5 applies only
to cases in which the United States brings the case. This restriction on the use of
national service of process was not incorporated into RICO.
119 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 160 (1969).
120 Id. at 161.
121 See H. REP. No. 91-1549, at 58 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,
4034-35.
122 Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 559-60 (2000) (refusing to alter the statute of
limitations from the antitrust model because "neither the RICO pattern requirement
nor the occurrence of fraud in RICO patterns is a good reason to ignore the Clayton
Act model"); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
150-52 (1987) (noting that antitrust practices were extensively incorporated into
RICO and holding that this justifies using the antitrust statute of limitations of four
years for RICO).
123 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (hold-
ing that, unlike antitrust claims, RICO claims may be made arbitrable by contract
because the "private attorney general role for the typical RICO plaintiff is simply less
plausible than it is for the typical antitrust plaintiff" since it is more likely that an
antitrust case will be have a widespread benefit on society); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1985) (holding that the fact that an antitrust civil plaintiff
2005] 1243
1244 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8o:3
justice" test employed by courts in the antitrust setting would work just
as well for § 1965(b). Thus, lower courts should interpret § 1965(b)
in a similar fashion as the Supreme Court has interpreted 15 U.S.C.
§5.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the "ends of justice" required national service on "other" defendants
under § 5 even though the case was brought in Missouri where only
one of the seventy-one defendant corporations and none of the seven
individual defendants were otherwise within the circuit court's juris-
diction.124 Many of these defendants could have been brought within
the jurisdiction of a New York court without national service of pro-
cess.1 25 Standard Oil makes it clear that the "ends of justice" allow a
court to exercise jurisdiction even where other forums may have juris-
diction without national service of process.
The lower court in Standard Oil dealt with the "ends of justice"
requirement in depth. The defendants argued that the "ends of jus-
tice" do not require national service of process because the New York
district would have venue and jurisdiction over most of the defend-
ants. The court rejected this argument outright, stating that "[t]he
question presented [was] not in which court the ends of justice re-
quired the complainant to choose to institute its suit, but whether or
not in this suit the ends of justice required that the nonresident de-
fendants should be brought in." 126 Thus, the "ends of justice test" is
not a license for the court to determine whether other courts would
be better, but only whether the defendants are sufficiently connected
to the current case against the resident defendants. The court further
held:
Congress did not confer jurisdiction, in this class of cases, upon the
Circuit Court in whose district the largest number of conspirators
resided, but upon every Circuit Court in whose district a resident
conspirator could be found and served with process. It did not
grant to any of the Circuit Courts the power to select the court in
which the [complainant] should institute its suit. If it had done so,
must suffer antitrust injury is irrelevant when interpreting RICO because antitrust
injury has no analogue in the RICO setting).
124 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 46 (1911) ("We are of the opin-
ion that, in consequence of the presence within the district of the Waters-Pierce Oil
Company, the court, under the authority of § 5 of the Anti-trust act, rightly took juris-
diction over the cause, and properly ordered notice to be served upon the non-resi-
dent defendants.").
125 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 152 F. 290, 296 (E.D. Mo. 1907)
("[M]ore of [the nonresident defendants] and more of the original and chief con-
spirators resided in the Southern district of New York . .
126 Id.
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each court might have selected another. It left the complainant
free to commence its suit in any Circuit Court in which it could find
and serve a resident conspirator. It instituted its suit in this court
and invoked its exercise of its power to acquire jurisdiction of the
defendants by the issue and service of its process.'
27
This argument applies with equal force to RICO, as Congress
could have chosen many other ways of allowing national service of
process but instead incorporated the antitrust language presumably
knowing how broadly it had been interpreted. Thus, the requirement
stated in Butcher's Union, Lisak, and PT United Can that the "ends of
justice" test prohibits national service of process and venue when an-
other court could have jurisdiction over the defendants is simply
wrong. There is no such requirement.
The Standard Oil defendants also argued that the "ends ofjustice"
are not met when the defendant already within the court's jurisdiction
is not a part of the entire antitrust conspiracy alleged against the
"other" defendants. The court rejected this argument, holding the
"ends of justice" do not prevent national service of process against
"other" defendants even when the initial defendant has but a minor
role in the antitrust charges. The court stated:
Congress has unlimited discretion here. It might have conditioned
this authority by rank, by the power, or by the degree of participa-
tion in the conspiracy of the resident defendant. The fact that it
failed to do so raises a persuasive presumption that it never in-
tended to impose any condition or limitation of this nature. 128
The "ends of justice" requirement, then, does not limit the plaintiffs
choice of forum to only those where the major players in the conspir-
acy are within the court's jurisdiction and venue. Suit may be brought
and "other" defendants brought in where the court has initial jurisdic-
tion and venue over only a minor player.1 29 Applying the antitrust
holding to RICO means that if a court has jurisdiction over the RICO
defendant with the most minor role, the § 1965(b) "ends of justice"
test does not prohibit bringing in the "other" defendants.
Finally, the Standard Oil defendants argued that the government's
request to bring them in under the jurisdiction and venue of the court
could not have been filed until the court had jurisdiction over the
127 Id.
128 Id. at 294.
129 Id. The court went on to say that " [p]erhaps none of the alleged conspirators
participates in every part of the conception and of the work of the combination, but
every one of them takes his part in the plan or in its execution, a part promotive of its
purpose, the restraint and monopolization of commerce." Id.
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initial defendant.130 The court could find "no sound reason" to re-
quire the initial defendant to be served first. The court held that for
the government to show the "ends ofjustice" required national service
of process, the government only had to name all of the alleged con-
spirators as defendants, state their connection to the conspiracy, and
list the places where the "other" defendants may be served.
13 1
The court then argued that it had a duty to hear the entire case as
to all the defendants in one hearing, stating:
[I]n every suit in which the power to acquire jurisdiction of the sub-
ject-matter and of the parties is conferred upon the court, the duty
is imposed upon it, if its discharge is invoked by the complainant, to
summon and hear, before every decision, not only every indispensa-
ble party, but every necessary party within reach of its process, every
party who has an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be
made a party to the suit in order that the court may finally adjudi-
cate the whole matter, although if he were not amenable to process,
final justice might be administered between the other parties with-
out his presence.
1 3 2
The "ends of justice" requirement in an antitrust determination is
viewed as doing justice to the parties by ensuring that all the defend-
ants needed for a full and just adjudication are present. The RICO
"ends of justice" requirement serves the same purpose.
To summarize the Standard Oil holding, as affirmed by the Su-
preme Court, the "ends of justice" do not prohibit national process
and venue if there is another forum in which all defendants can be
brought, and even the defendant with the most minor part in the anti-
trust violation can be the basis for the court bringing in the "other"
defendants. To meet the "ends of justice" requirement, the plaintiff
must simply state the defendants, state their connection to the viola-
tion, and state where the "other" defendants are located; if the "other"
defendants are necessary for the full adjudication of the antitrust
charges, the court will find that the "ends of justice" require bringing
the defendants before the court.
This has remained the standard for antitrust "ends of justice." In
United States v. National City Lines, Inc.,13 3 a district court suggested that
the "ends of justice" requirement was evidence that Congress did not
intend to leave the choice of forum entirely up to the plaintiff and
that forum non conveniens doctrine could be exercised by the courts
130 Id.
131 Id. at 295-96.
132 Id.
133 7 F.R.D. 456 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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to refuse jurisdiction when the defendants could also be brought
before a more convenient forum.134 However, the Supreme Court
overruled the lower court, holding that if jurisdiction was proper as to
the defendants under § 5 and § 12 of the Sherman Act and they were
properly before the court, the court could not decline to exercise its
jurisdiction through the forum non conveniens doctrine even if the
court believed other forums were more convenient.13 5 Interestingly,
Justice Jackson agreed that forum non conveniens could not be used
to dismiss an antitrust case, but argued that the court could decline
jurisdiction over the "other" defendants if it thought the forum to be
inconvenient under the "ends of justice" requirement; however, he
was alone in this opinion. I36 Thus, a court has little discretion to de-
cline jurisdiction over the "other" defendants under the "ends of jus-
tice" requirement if the defendants are necessary to the full
adjudication of the case.
There have been few other antitrust cases involving an "ends of
justice" inquiry.1 37 It has been held that notice of hearing and formal
134 Id. at 464. The court did not hold that the "ends ofjustice" did not require the
defendants to be brought before the court, but that the court could refuse to hear the
case entirely under forum non conveniens. The "ends of justice" requirement was
cited as evidence that Congress did not mean to make the plaintiff's choice of forum
absolute in response to the plaintiffs assertion that Standard Oil required the court to
hear the case. Id.
135 United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 597 (1948).
136 Id. at 598-99 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated:
In this case, the defendants, who might be entitled to urge the doctrine,
have not resisted or contested the order bringing them into the suit. It was
by so doing that they could have shown that the ends ofjustice would not be
served by such action. Instead, they desire to submit to being brought in
and then use their position to throw the whole case out.
Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
137 See United States v. Cent. States Theatre Corp., 187 F. Supp. 114, 143 (D. Neb.
1960) (holding that upon motion by plaintiffs, a nonresident defendant was properly
brought within the court's jurisdiction because "it appear[ed] that the ends ofjustice
require [d] that the [defendant] be brought before this court"); United States v. Gen.
Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157, 163 (D.N.J. 1949) ("Since [resident defendants]
are found to be within the District of New Jersey, it was proper to bring in a non-
resident defendant pursuant to Section 5 of the Sherman Act. . . ."); United States v.
Forestal Land, Timber & Rys., 89 F. Supp. 316, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (holding that
because the "ends ofjustice" impose the only requirement for adding additional par-
ties under § 5 and because it "would be desirable and just that [the other defendant]
be brought into the instant action," the court could bring the "other" defendant
before it); United States v. Nat'l Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 6 F.2d 40, 40-42
(N.D. Ohio 1924) (holding that § 5 allows for national service of process when one
member of an antitrust conspiracy is properly before the court in a case involving
fifty-two corporate defendants and forty-nine individual defendants).
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hearings are not prerequisites for a finding that the "ends of justice"
require national service of process, 138 that "other" defendants may be
added by a supplemental complaint under § 5 after the commence-
ment of the action,139 and that a court does not have venue or per-
sonal jurisdiction to hear cross-claims between defendants by
operation of § 5.140 There do not appear'to be any cases finding that
the "ends ofjustice" do not allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant.
To conclude, the antitrust cases interpreting the "ends ofjustice"
clause held the test only to require that the plaintiff show the "other"
defendants to be connected to the suit and that a full adjudication of
the case would require the presence of the "other" defendants before
the court. Because RICO incorporated this "ends of justice" require-
ment and there is a definitive interpretation of the "ends of justice"
clause in the antitrust context, the "ends ofjustice" interpretation that
is settled law in the antitrust context ought to be definitive for the
RICO "ends of justice" test.
b. Liberal Interpretation Clause
RICO itself specifies how it ought to be interpreted. It states that
"[t] he provisions of this Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes. " 141 The Supreme Court has relied on this
clause to strike down attempts by lower courts to improperly restrict
RICO's broad reach. 142
A liberal interpretation of § 1965(b)'s "ends of justice" require-
ment would not add additional strict requirements to the exercise of
national service of process when other less stringent and justifiable
interpretations are available, such as the interpretation offered here.
A strict requirement that there be no other court before which all the
138 Cent. States Theatre, 187 F. Supp. at 144 ("[l]t is simply recalled that notice of
hearing and formal hearing are not made prerequisites to such an order or finding
[that the ends of justice require national service of process].").
139 Forestal Land, 89 F. Supp. at 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (holding that because the
'ends ofjustice" was the only requirement to adding additional parties under § 5, and
the court thought it would be beneficial to add the "other" defendant to the case, it
made no difference that the events for which the "other" defendant was being called
happened before the commencement of the suit).
140 United States v. Krasnov, 109 F. Supp. 143, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1952) ("The section,
15 U.S.C.A. § 5, under which these three defendants were summoned into this district
confers jurisdiction on this Court, as I read the statute, only for the purpose of
preventing and restraining violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.").
141 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941,
947.
142 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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defendants may be brought 43 or a multi-factor test inquiring into the
balance of burdens and judicial economy14 4 add additional hurdles a
plaintiff must overcome before obtaining his remedy. 14 5 The liberal
interpretation clause exists to prevent and clear away such restrictive
interpretations of the statute that create obstacles the plaintiff must
overcome before having his day in court. These tests imposed on
plaintiffs prior to bringing in the "other" defendants cannot be justi-
fied in light of the liberal interpretation clause.
c. Potential Objections
The only commentator to consider how to interpret the "ends of
justice" test argued that the test was not restrictive enough. Professor
Dickerson argued that the "ends of justice" test intended to limit the
use of expanded venue and jurisdiction but she did not consider the
antitrust precedents or the liberal interpretation clause. The jist of
her argument is that national service of process can result in defend-
ants being forced to litigate in inconvenient forums often against friv-
olous RICO charges, and because this result is unfair and contrary to
Congress's intention, the "ends ofjustice" ought to incorporate much
more stringent requirements.1 46 She notes:
[J]udicial confusion about when and how to apply 1965(b) has en-
couraged some plaintiffs to add questionable RICO claims to draw
multiple defendants into a forum in which some have no contacts.
To make matters worse, when a defendant attempts to eliminate the
RICO claim through an early motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction or for improper venue, courts typically refuse to ex-
amine whether the plaintiff has stated a valid RICO claim .... For
years, litigants have manipulated § 1965 in ways Congress never en-
visioned nor intended.
1 47
Professor Dickerson, however, offers nothing other than her own
policy views to support her claim that Congress intended § 1965 to be
143 See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
145 Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617, at *26 n.3 (D.N.J.
Sept. 29, 1986).
[R]equiring a plaintiff to anticipate a court's view of the one, most conve-
nient forum in which to pursue a RICO claim, particularly in the case of a
complex, nationwide conspiracy, prior to any discovery of the defendant, will
invariably result in a number of wrong guesses and an uneconomical overuse
of the case transferring mechanism.
Id.
146 Dickerson, supra note 40, at 481-82.
147 Id.
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interpreted narrowly. She creates her own four-prong test to deter-
mine whether national service of process should be allowed under
§ 1965(b) and a two-prong test to determine whether venue should be
proper under § 1965(b).1 4 The four-prong test incorporates a due
process examination of contacts to the United States, considers due
process fairness concerns, examines the merits of the RICO claim,
and takes into account whether an alternative forum exists. The two-
prong venue approach requires another balancing test weighing the
merits of trying the case in the current venue. Her goal with the sepa-
rate tests is to "separate the venue analysis from the personal jurisdic-
tion analysis under 1965 (b); ensure all parties a fair forum; discourage
plaintiffs from adding RICO claims merely to gain a forum advantage;
abide by the legislative intent; and bring some degree of uniformity
and consistency to the venue determinations under civil RICO. 1 49
The multi-prong tests incorporate into their analysis due process,
forum non conveniens, and § 1404 transfer factors.15 0 The factors
suggested by Dickerson are applied no matter what the interpretation
of § 1965(b) when the defendant raises due process, § 1404 transfer,
or forum non conveniens challenges.' 5 ' Including them in § 1965(b)
is duplicative. There is nothing to suggest that Congress intended
such a complex and superfluous interpretation, and Dickerson does
not state how these multi-step tests "abide by the legislative intent."
Fairness to the defendant and prevention of forum shopping are
two factors that Professor Dickerson's test surely promotes. It is true
that RICO provides large incentives for frivolous allegations, includ-
ing favorable venue and jurisdictional provisions. It is also true that
the Supreme Court held that RICO's remedial purposes are flouted
by interpretations that "open the door" to frivolous suits. 152 The Su-
preme Court has also stated that abuse of RICO is not justification for
interpreting RICO's terms in an unduly narrow fashion and that
though RICO may be used in ways Congress did not foresee, Congress
may limit RICO if it is misused. 153
The interpretation of § 1965(b) offered here, however, does not
"open the door" to frivolous suits. Congress, the Constitution, and
the courts protect a defendant's convenience by providing for a
change of venue statute, due process, and forum non conveniens.
Good faith plaintiffs bringing RICO actions would gain little by bring-
148 Id. at 531-38.
149 Id. at 538.
150 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
151 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
152 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992).
153 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498-500 (1985).
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ing cases in forums knowing the case would be transferred under
§ 1404 or due process. Bad faith plaintiffs seeking to abuse RICO's
broad procedural provisions can be punished by the courts under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.154 However, the fact that some
inconvenience would result for defendants is not an argument against
interpreting RICO broadly. Congress surely knew that § 1965 would
cause inconvenience to RICO defendants, but favored the conve-
nience of plaintiffs with RICO claims. The purpose of the liberal inter-
pretation clause and Congress's intent in adding the "ends of justice"
requirement is to benefit plaintiffs.
155
III. WAYS IN WHICH CIVIL RICO DEFENDANTS MAY DEFEAT
PLAINTIFFS' CHOICE OF FORUMS
Courts' interpretations of the "ends of justice" test have often oc-
curred in a vacuum, as though no other protection for defendants'
convenience or fairness exists. These ad hoc determinations of what
justice requires have often mimicked tests for personal jurisdiction
under due process, forum non conveniens determinations, or the
§ 1404 change of venue test. All of these doctrines aim to protect the
interests of courts and society in ensuring litigation takes place in a
manner and location that is fair and convenient to defendants, wit-
nesses, and the court system itself.
A. Change of Venue: 28 U.S.C. § 1404
Congress has given courts the power to transfer cases for the con-
venience of parties and witnesses to any other district where the case
might be brought in the interest of justice.1 56 The § 1404 "interest of
justice" test has nothing to do with the "ends ofjustice" test and ought
to be interpreted in the context of its own wording, purpose, and leg-
islative history.
154 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 states that by "presenting to the court... a plead-
ing, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" that the pleading "is not being
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Id. Rule 11 also prohibits frivolous
claims. Id.
155 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (noting "Congress' self-consciously expansive language
and overall approach" and RICO's "express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,'" and stating that the "statute's 'reme-
dial purposes' are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for
those injured by racketeering activity").
156 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
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Congress passed § 1404 to reflect the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens as it existed at that time for the purpose of ensuring that trials
occur in a location that is convenient to parties and witnesses.1 57 Ei-
ther party can move to transfer, and the moving party bears the bur-
den of showing both that it would increase the convenience to the
parties and witnesses and be in the interest of justice. When a court
considers whether to transfer the case, it considers numerous factors,
including the plaintiff's choice of forum and whether it involved fo-
rum shopping, convenience to the witnesses, the materiality of the wit-
nesses' testimony, pending similar or related cases and their locations,
ability of litigants to bear the cost in a particular forum, the location
of the event giving rise to the cause of action, possible delay in trans-
ferring the case, and other factors depending on the facts of the
case.15 8 One can see in the § 1404 transfer factors many of the same
factors wrongly and duplicatively used by courts interpreting RICO's
"ends of justice" test.' 59
B. Violation of Due Process Rights
A defendant may always challenge a court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction as an unconstitutional violation of the defendant's due
process rights. When Rule 4(k) applies to limit the federal court's
jurisdiction to that of the courts in the state in which the federal court
sits, the Fourteenth Amendment limits the federal court's jurisdiction
through Rule 4(k). Fourteenth Amendment due process allows a
state court to exercise personal jurisdiction if the defendant'is present
in the state, a citizen of the state, has an agent in the state, or has
minimum contacts with the state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington160
created the minimum contacts test, stating:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
157 H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at 132 (1947), quoted in United States v. Nat'l City Lines
Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 81 n.2 (1949).
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though
the venue is proper.... The new subsection requires the court to determine
that the transfer is necessary for the convenience of the parties and wit-
nesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so.
Id.
158 See Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer Under Forum Non
Conveniens Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R. FED. 15, 31-38
(1969) [hereinafter Questions] (listing relevant factors).
159 See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
160 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
16 1
The International Shoe minimum contacts test has developed into a
complicated two-tiered test, first ensuring that the defendant has min-
imum contacts with the forum state and second determining whether
allowing the state to exercise personal jurisdiction would violate
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
162
The first prong looks only into the relationship between the de-
fendant and the state. Each case is very fact specific, and factors cited
in International Shoe and later cases for determining whether the mini-
mum contacts test is met include the quality of defendant's contacts
with the forum, 63 the quantity of defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum, 1 64 the foreseeability by the defendant that suit would be brought
in the state, 165 the benefits and protections the defendant received
from the state,1 66 the extent to which the defendant's activities have
had an effect in the state, 167 and the degree to which the defendant's
connection to the state is willful.
168
The second prong of the International Shoe test is a fairness test.1
69
If defending in a forum is burdensome on the defendant and the bur-
161 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
162 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 22, § 3.10, at 124-29 (detailing the various fac-
tors used to determine whether minimum contacts are present and whether "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are violated).
163 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ("Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity .. ").
164 Id. at 320 (holding that "systematic and continuous" activities in a state suggest
the minimum contacts test was satisfied).
165 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (" [T]he
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is... that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.").
166 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ("[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the
privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of
the laws of that state.").
167 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) ("Jurisdiction over petitioners is
therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in
California.").
168 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the require-
ment of contact with the forum State.").
169 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) ("Once it has been
decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the fo-
rum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and sub-
stantial justice.'").
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den cannot be justified by other factors, due process forbids the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction through the minimum contacts approach.
Determining this involves considering a variety of factors, including
"'the burden on the defendant,' 'the forum State's interest in adjudi-
cating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief,' 'the interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and the 'shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive so-
cial policies.'"170
One question that remains is whether the fairness factors apply
when personal jurisdiction is not based on minimum contacts but on
presence or citizenship. The Supreme Court split when determining
whether the fairness factors applied when a defendant was served
while briefly within the forum state. Justice Scalia wrote for four jus-
tices to argue that service within the territory of the government is
always fair under due process. 171 Justice Brennan wrote for four jus-
tices arguing that in such situations due process requires an applica-
tion of the fairness prong of the minimum contacts test. 172 Justice
Stevens did not join either opinion. 73 If Justice Scalia is correct, the
fairness test created to ensure that defendants are not forced to de-
fend in an inconvenient forum does not apply when personal jurisdic-
tion is established by service on a party within the state. If Justice
Brennan is correct, no matter where a defendant is served an exami-
nation must be made into whether it is fair to force the defendant to
defend the case in a particular forum. It does seem that in an almost
all cases, however, service in a state will meet due process require-
ments under either test.
Because the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by its
terms only applies to states, when Congress authorizes national service
of process to allow a federal court to serve a defendant anywhere
within the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.
Rather, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies. 174 How-
ever, the analysis created under the Fourteenth Amendment to apply
170 Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
171 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) ("[J]urisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.'").
172 Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
174 Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 (1987).
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to states has been applied to the federal system under the Fifth
Amendment.
175
When Congress authorizes national service of process, defend-
ants can be served anywhere in the nation and forced to defend in the
plaintiff's chosen forum. It is beyond question that Congress has such
authority.176 The difficult question is determining what limits Fifth
Amendment due process puts on the exercise of personal jurisdiction
in such cases.
Some courts adopt the Fourteenth Amendment fairness factors to
determine whether "the combination of the federal interest in fur-
thering fundamental social policies, the judicial system's interest in
the efficient resolution of controversies, the particular forum's inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief outweigh the burden on the
defendant."1
77
Other courts only inquire into whether the defendant has na-
tional contacts with the United States without examining the fairness
of exercising jurisdiction. This approach somewhat follows Justice
Scalia's argument in Burnham. More precisely, according to Justice
Scalia's opinion in Burnham, assuming Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process requirements are identical, mere United States citi-
zenship or presence within the United States satisfies Fifth
Amendment due process because those are traditional justifications
for a court's exercise of jurisdiction. Whether personal jurisdiction
based on presence within the forum court's territory will alone satisfy
due process is unresolved. However, it is still clearly the case that
states have personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment
over all citizens of that state. 178 If the Fifth Amendment is to be inter-
preted the same way, citizens of the United States may be brought
175 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1068.1, at 625 (3d ed. 2002).
176 Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Congress could pro-
vide for service of process anywhere in the United States."); Robertson v. R.R. Labor
Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) ("Congress clearly has the power, likewise, to provide
that the process of every district court shall run into every part of the United States.");
Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[T]here is no
constitutional obstacle to nationwide service of process in the federal courts in fed-
eral-question cases.").
177 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 175, § 1068.1, at 625; see, e.g., Peay v. Bellsouth
Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (2000) (holding that Fifth Amendment
due process requires that the fairness prong of the minimum contacts test apply even
when the defendant is served within the United States).
178 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
175, § 1065, at 347.
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before any United States court in civil cases without violating due pro-
cess. This is not currently how most courts approach the issue,
however.
Without straightening out the muddle that is personal jurisdic-
tion, it is enough to say that a defendant will have a difficult time
defeating plaintiff's choice of forum through appeals to due process.
Congress's decision to allow national service of process is given defer-
ence, and it is rare for a forum to be so burdensome that it will trigger
due process fairness problems. Those most likely to benefit from the
due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment will be foreign
defendants.
C. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens still has some application
even though 28 U.S.C. § 1404 codified a provision allowing courts to
transfer cases when the forum is unfair to defendants or inconvenient.
The two biggest differences are that forum non conveniens requires a
greater showing of inconvenience and injustice than does a motion
for transfer under § 1404, and a successful forum non conveniens mo-
tion allows the court to dismiss the case rather than transfer the case
as a court must do under § 1404.179 Forum non conveniens is basi-
cally the only way for a defendant to obtain a change of venue when a
foreign court is prefereable; the doctrine is most often used in that
context.
When a defendant moves for forum non conveniens, he must
show first that there is an alternative forum in which the suit may be
brought and that the forum has an adequate remedy available to the
plaintiff. The court will not dismiss a suit for inconvenience if doing
179 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955). The court stated that
the forum non conveniens doctrine is quite different from Section 1404(a).
That doctrine [forum non conveniens] involves the dismissal of a case be-
cause the forum chosen by the plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and
inconvenient that it is better to stop the litigation in the place where
brought and let it start all over again somewhere else. It is quite naturally
subject to careful limitation for it not only denies the plaintiff the generally
accorded privilege of bringing an action where he chooses, but makes it pos-
sible for him to lose out completely, through the running of the statute of
limitations in the forum finally deemed appropriate. Section 1404(a) avoids
this latter danger.
Id. (quoting All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952)).
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so would withhold all remedy from a plaintiff. Second, the defendant
must show that a balance of all factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
180
The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert s18 laid out the fac-
tors that courts must weigh in a determination of whether a suit
should be dismissed under forum non conveniens. Factors relating to
convenience of the party include
ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.'
8 2
When determining whether an alternative forum exists, the court
must also examine whether that forum has an adequate remedy availa-
ble for the plaintiff.1 83 The Supreme Court held in Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno that a forum was adequate even if the liability theory is different
or if the remedy was not as great unless there is danger that the plain-
tiff will be treated unfairly or deprived of all remedy.18 4 It has been
held numerous times that the fact that RICO-type claims cannot be
brought in a foreign jurisdiction does not defeat forum non con-
veniens if the plaintiff could recover some remedy there.'
8 5 Most ju-
risdictions prohibit the type of offenses RICO makes predicate to a
RICO claim, and thus plaintiffs with a RICO claim are rarely without a
remedy in foreign courts. Thus RICO defendants may defeat plain-
tiffs choice of forum if they are able to convince the court that forum
non conveniens requires the court to dismiss.
180 Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 951 (11th Cir. 1997) ("A
party moving to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens must demonstrate: (1)
that an adequate alternative forum is available; and (2) that the private and public
interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal."); Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance
Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that forum non conveniens re-
quires that: (1) there be an alternative forum, (2) the balance of factors weigh in
favor of inconvenience and (3) the alternative forum's remedy would not be
inadequate).
181 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
182 Id. at 508.
183 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981).
184 Id. at 247. The Court stated that "[t]he possibility of a change in substantive
law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum
non conveniens inquiry." Id.
185 P.T. United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir.
1998) (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 250; Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 811
F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1987); Kempe v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 876 F.2d
1138, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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CONCLUSION
RICO's complex procedural provisions have caused great confu-
sion; however, a straightforward interpretation of the text guided by
the liberal construction clause and the antitrust precedents provides
clear answers. Section 1965(a) expands venue for courts hearing
RICO cases and § 1965(d) expands personal jurisdiction. If at least
one RICO defendant can be brought before the court under these
provisions, but other RICO defendants cannot be brought before the
court, § 1965(b) allows the court to exercise personal jurisdiction and
venue over these "other" defendants if the "ends ofjustice" require it.
Following the antitrust interpretations of the "ends of justice," the
court will require the defendants to appear if the court determines
that the presence of the defendants is reasonably necessary for the
adjudication of the RICO claim. Defendants then may exercise one of
the various means the law provides to change the forum if it is incon-
venient for them. Following these suggestions can help to sort out the
mess § 1965 interpretation has become.
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